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PRESENT POLITICAL TENDENCIES

I

BRYANISM

Energy cannot be destroyed. It may change its form, some of it may be dissipated, but none of it can be annihilated. While guarding one's self, in accord with Huxley's warning, against analogies drawn from the field of science for use in the very human field of politics, it seems that what is loosely known as Bryanism, considered in its broader aspect, is really a form of energy. Some of it has been dissipated. But the remainder has not gone through a transformation from one form of energy to another such as probably would have taken place had Mr. Bryan been elected President of the United States and incurred those heavy responsibilities of government which tend to bring a leader and his party under conservative influences.¹

The history of the Democratic party reveals the fundamental character of Bryanism. John Adams once said,² in describing the colonial origin of our political parties, that

¹ "It is a proverb that to turn a radical into a conservative there needs only to put him into office."—James Russell Lowell.

² See "The Significance of the Democratic Party in American Politics," by Professor A. D. Morse, of Amherst College, in *International Monthly*, October, 1900,

"in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts and all the rest a court and country party has always contended." That "country" party was the democracy of the colonies, as opposed to the colonial aristocracy, and it generated the rebellious impulse that made the triumphant Revolutionary War. What Eldridge Gerry called "an excess of democracy," after the war, permitted a conservative reaction to set in. Reactions are often beneficial, and the undying glory of that particular reaction was the Federal Constitution of 1787.

Hamilton, the leader of the conservative party, profoundly distrusted popular institutions. And, as Professor Morse¹ has written, the clear tendency of his constructive statesmanship, in President Washington's cabinet, "was to foster the growth of a moneyed aristocracy and to make it the permanent ally of the government." Against tendencies of that character arose the movement of the Jeffersonians, which proved successful in 1800. That the uprising was primarily against what the Jeffersonians believed to be the menace of plutocratic aristocracy to democratic ideals cannot be doubted.

The tendency of radicalism to be mastered by conservative influences, when it has assumed the immense responsibilities of government, was illustrated by the "Jeffersonian period." Within twenty years after Jefferson's first inauguration the "Jacobin" party became the abiding place of a large part of the conservatism and wealth of the country; and in twenty-four years it elected as President a statesman who was no other than the son of John and Abigail Adams. There had been a transformation of energy from radicalism to conservatism, but the radical force was still existent. And it proved itself again supreme when the Jacksonians overthrew the later Jeffersonians in 1828.

Much that Andrew Jackson did is condemned by historians, yet he was the accepted political champion of the more

¹ See "The Significance of the Democratic Party in American Politics," by Professor A. D. Morse, of Amherst College, in *International Monthly*, October, 1900.

democratic portion of the people and he incarnated a radical force that viewed with deep distrust the moneyed and aristocratic influences of the time. Essentially, the uprising of the Jacksonians against the later Jeffersonians was the same in character as that of the early Jeffersonians against the Hamiltonians.¹ But, like the Jeffersonian movement, that of the Jacksonians was soon mastered by conservative influences. In less than a generation it had been degraded into a political machine for the protection of the Southern slaveholders and their financial allies in the mercantile and manufacturing North, while during the acute slavery conflict and the Civil War period its normal and primary characteristics were lost to view. Abraham Lincoln became the "defender of the faith," the great democrat of the age.

In the twenty-five years after Appomattox the party called Democratic tended slowly to reassume the character which the slavery struggle had so distorted. The wage-earning classes in the North, especially in the large cities and towns, had clung to it with surprising tenacity. Both Mr. Tilden and Mr. Cleveland were conservative leaders and their popular successes in 1876 and 1884 were due to the errors, corruption, and popular weariness of prolonged Republican rule. Mr. Cleveland's second election in 1892, however, showed that the Democratic party was again growing radical in the same sense that the democracy in 1800 and 1828 had been radical. Not only had the great strikes of that year embittered labor organizations, but in 1890 there had appeared one of the most extraordinary movements recorded in American politics, the uprising among the farmers of the Western and Southwestern States.

Populism was based on discontent. Even in a party sense it was democratic if you accept Professor Morse's definition that "the Democratic party is the political champion of

¹ It is almost amusing now to read that the Whigs always maintained that the party of Jackson was not the party of Jefferson. "It was in their eyes a new and dangerous party which had filched the name of the party of Jefferson."—See "Political Parties in the United States," by Jesse Macy, page 34.

those elements of the democracy which are most democratic." Jackson himself, to quote Professor Morse again, "stood forth as the champion of the poor, and made war in their behalf against the rich." And this Populist movement should be called democratic, using the word in its broad, philosophic sense, simply because it emanated from the more common of the common people and was an expression of discontent with prevailing conditions.

That the Populist movement made its coming felt originally in the Republican party of Kansas and Nebraska, eleven years ago, was due to the Civil War. The great conflict over secession had left a strong sectional impress upon parties in the West so that as late as 1888 Kansas and Nebraska, which contained great numbers of Union veterans, were Republican by enormous majorities. Yet in that preponderantly Republican population there was a large class who, under certain conditions, would passionately support a crusade against wealth. With their old war prejudices against the Democratic party their revolt speedily took the form of a new, independent political organization. In the South the essentially democratic nature of the Populist movement was demonstrated by the speed and ease with which the old party organization of the ruling class was captured by the "poor whites," led by such leaders as Tillman, or with which the older leaders like Morgan and Daniel acquiesced in much of its political program.

Silverism, it is true, became the leading point in the Populistic program, although Populism had very much in common with the contemporaneous uprising of the Australasian democracy. But that was because the issue had "availability" in politics, owing to the conditions peculiar to this country. Silver had been demonetized less than twenty years before the elections of 1890, and its "restoration" had been openly encouraged in Congress and out by prominent leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Add to that the facts that the United States was a silver-

producing country, that it was a "debtor nation," and that such economists as the late General F. A. Walker were apostles of bimetallism, and you have an explanation of the final concentration of the radical movement in the United States upon "16 to 1," whereas, in Australasia the radical movement, although agrarian, largely took an entirely different course. Silverism gained a "paramountcy" as an issue, yet it was only a passing manifestation of a force groping for weapons with which to wage its conflict with conditions that inspired discontent.

The Australasian radical movement, which was the result of the same world-wide economic depression which produced American Populism, ought to be considered in this connection. Both movements were democratic in the broad sense of the word, the main difference between them being that the one succeeded in dominating the political situation in its field, while the other did not. The reason for the success in Australasia and the failure in the United States is made clear by a New Zealand statesman, Mr. W. P. Reeves,¹ who has written in a recent article:

"He (the Australasian farmer) must have cheaper money if he is to live. If this be so when prices are at an average level, it is easy to understand that in years like 1893, 1894 and 1895, when depression was extreme, the bitter cry of the indebted farmer was heard very loudly indeed. Now the farmer and sheep-owner are not only relatively a more important economic element in the colonies than here (England) but they are more powerful in politics. The British globe-trotter is told in Australasian clubs that the working men rule the colonies. The artisan and the shearer no doubt have their say in public affairs. But, one year and another, they are less powerful than the tillers and graziers. When, therefore, the latter were pressed to the wall in the bad times of 1893-95 it was natural that their governments should cast about for means to help them. In Australasia governments are, rightly or wrongly, expected to be of use in public emergency, and under the head of public emergency dull times are included."

¹"Colonial Governments as Money Lenders."—*National Review*, December, 1900.

The result was that in Australasia the governments became direct money-lenders to the farmers at cheap rates of interest and did various other interesting things of a radically socialistic nature, and are still doing them, all of which, in substance, our American Populists had desired their government to do for them.¹ Populism won in Australasia because Australasia is a new, undeveloped country, where capital and vested financial interests are still comparatively weak in politics. Populism lost in the United States because capital and vested financial interests are grown relatively very powerful here. The essentially democratic quality of the movement in each country, however, remains the same whether in victory or defeat.

In 1890 and 1892 American Populism displayed great political strength. Mr. Cleveland, although a conservative man of the most orthodox New York associations, profited by the Populist disaffection in his third campaign for the presidency. His political manager, Mr. W. C. Whitney, who was able to carry New York only by a plurality of 45,000, and without a majority over all, made astute use of the Western Populists by arranging fusions with them wherever there seemed to be a prospect of diverting electoral votes from General Harrison to General Weaver. How powerful that radical movement was in 1892, following the political upheaval of 1890, we can now appreciate by merely recalling the fact that the Populist candidate for President polled over a million popular votes and outdid all third party precedents by the strength he displayed in the electoral college.

Even independent votes were cast in the East for Mr. Cleveland on the ground that "predatory wealth" was becoming entrenched in the national government.² Mr.

¹ See also H. D. Lloyd's "Newest England," besides Mr. Reeves' *National Review* article. The platforms of the farmers' alliance in the early '90's may be referred to as well.

² "It is not surprising that labor, believing itself to be oppressed, soon rose in revolt, and civil war has actually raged this summer in four different sections of

Cleveland, too, permitted himself to show sympathy with that feeling by his denunciations of the "sordid" phases of a high tariff and by his public references to the Homestead strikes. The conservative Democratic stump that year was a hot place for "robber barons."

It may truthfully be said that the wave of discontent, which started with such tremendous momentum in the elections of 1890, swept Mr. Cleveland into his second term as President. Both from circumstances and personal temperament, Mr. Cleveland was unable to satisfy the radicalism that had placed him in power. He might have succeeded had his administration not been so terribly weighted with the world-wide industrial depression of 1893-97. As it was, even tariff reform, on which Mr. Cleveland had set his heart, was betrayed by the capitalistic group of the Democratic senators, and his administration finally stood at bay. It was violently condemned, on the one hand, by the Republican opposition as responsible for hard times, and on the other, it faced the furious radical force that had created it without a single achievement that could cause a glow in radicalism's soul. Even the income tax, which was a genuine concession to radical feeling, was overthrown by the Supreme Court. The mighty defence of the gold standard alienated the silverites, while the great railroad strikes of 1894 completed the political misfortunes of the Cleveland régime by making the Democratic administration the sponsor for certain drastic military and judicial measures which, however necessary they might have been, could not fail to be regarded with suspicion by a democracy already filled with jealousy of what it believed to be plutocracy's growing power in the state.

the country. And, of course, the farmers, paying more for what they buy and getting less for what they sell, grow poorer day by day; and excellent farms in some of the most fertile sections of this most highly protected state will hardly bring the cost of the buildings upon them."—Wayne MacVeagh's letter, in October, 1892, to J. W. Carter, Secretary of the Massachusetts Reform Club, announcing his intention to vote for Mr. Cleveland.

The complete overthrow of the conservative wing of the Democratic party at the Chicago convention of 1896, and the ensuing alliance between the radical wing and the Populists was now a matter of course. For the forces of discontent had been disappointed in the Democratic administration.

Now the history of the Democratic party not only shows that Democratic leadership, when in office, becomes conservative, but that when the leadership has grown markedly conservative the restless element of the party periodically asserts its supremacy over it and attempts to gain control of the government in behalf of the more democratic portion of the American people. The uprising of the early Jeffersonians against the Hamiltonians, which originated party government under the Constitution, the overthrow of the later Jeffersonians by the Jacksonians and, in our own time, the tremendous political phenomenon known as Bryanism seem to justify the statement of a principle that is peculiar to democracy. It is simply this, that democracy tends to burst conservative bonds, especially when plutocracy appears to threaten a suspicious democracy's instinctive ideals. It was Hamilton's aristocracy of wealth that the early Jeffersonians rose against; it was the power of wealth that the Jacksonians assaulted so furiously; and certainly enough is now known of the antecedents and characteristics of Bryanism to make it clear that the heart and soul of its grievance is the alleged menace of plutocracy. The three movements led respectively by Jefferson, Jackson and Bryan were spiritually the same. Whatever their excesses and crudities, all were anti-aristocratic and anti-plutocratic, and therefore, they were all essentially democratic.

The substantial identity of the Democratic uprising under Bryan with those under Jefferson and Jackson being recognized, a most important fact must now be faced. While the earlier movements attained success at the polls and became invested with all the responsibilities of government, this one has been repulsed at two presidential elections in succession.

Without the joy of victory, without the satisfaction of achievement, without the responsibilities of power, such as the Jeffersonians and the Jacksonians had, to soften its crudities and modify its radicalism, this force remains at large and the problem of its disposition or destination is one of the most interesting of our political future.

Bryanism is more than "16 to 1"; it is a state of mind. Even prosperity can do no more than quiet it for a time, while it can no more be annihilated by presidential defeats than can electricity or candle power.

The peculiar significance of Mr. Bryan's second defeat, then, appears as soon as we attempt to answer the question, what is to become of Bryanism?

A steadily-baffled radicalism may dissipate some of its energy, but the residuum of force must tend to grow more radical. That is where psychology steps in. If a dog finds his bone pulled constantly from under his nose he finally may become furious enough to plunge through a picket fence. It is noteworthy that some of the leading Populists of the early '90's have already become outspoken socialists.

Notwithstanding that he has been charged with being a socialist, Mr. Bryan, however, had not shown up to the last presidential election any tendency in his thinking toward socialistic ideas. The leader of the discontent movement, so far as it has had real force in the field of practical politics, Mr. Bryan, curiously enough, has been thoroughly old-fashioned in his theories. His own statement not long ago, that he did not hold a single political principle that was not one hundred years old, can be demonstrated by an analysis of his opinions on public questions. It is extraordinary that he should have been hotly denounced as socialistic by men who were in reality more socialistic in their conception of competition and trusts, for example, than he ever has been. Even Mr. Bryan's bimetallic theories, which are at the basis of his silverism, are old-fashioned and out of date rather than socialistic. And in the matter of "government

by injunction," or the power of equity courts to punish for contempt, his position is the one that was generally held by English and American jurists only thirty years ago. As a president, Mr. Bryan, burdened with the responsibility of power, would probably have remained far more conservative, however, than he will now in the rôle of free lance.¹

But Mr. Bryan personally can be left entirely out of consideration. He may or may not have a political future. He may or may not maintain a position of leadership in the Democratic party. Eliminate him entirely. The important point is that what is loosely known as Bryanism, and which is really a radical impulse based on human discontent, continues in a state of intellectual fluidity, which is the prime requisite of the acceleration characteristic of radicalism.

II

INFLUENCE OF IMPERIALISM

In order to sense the future from the standpoint of the present, it is necessary to extend one's view over the world-wide field of contemporary politics so that political influences of a world-wide character may be detected and examined.

Broadly speaking, the general elections of 1900 in both the great English-speaking countries were a triumph for what has come to be generally known as imperialism.² And the result seems to have been logical since it expressed the predominant spirit of the time. The imperialistic movement is world-wide and thus far has been irresistible, owing to the combination in its favor, whether in Germany, France, England, or the United States, of such mighty influences as

¹ This is already shown to be true by Mr. Bryan's public endorsement of an independent "municipal ownership" candidacy for the office of mayor of St. Louis in the spring of the present year, 1901.

² The writer will use this word, "imperialism," because it is used by all parties in Great Britain without protest; it is necessary also to have some one word to describe the expansion movement in the various countries of Europe and America to which reference will be made. No other word meets the requirements so well as this one.

the popular sentiment for the flag, modern finance and the missionary impulse of the Christian religion. Finance has demanded new markets, and the church, new or broader fields of evangelization. As for the flag, "who will haul it down?"

So far as the United States is concerned, the radical Democratic movement led by Mr. Bryan beat in vain against this imperialistic combination. The flag sentiment was against it; the evangelical church was against it on foreign missionary grounds, and "business" was against it because "business" was entirely content with the present situation and fearful of any change. Business interests in our time have grown proportionately stronger in politics than they were when they unsuccessfully fought Jefferson the century before. Von Holst¹ says that the Jeffersonians "were far inferior to the Federalists in the numbers and ability of their leaders; and moreover, the great moneyed interests of the Northern States were the cornerstone of the federal party."

In order, now, to project the future of the radical movement in America we must first consider the effect of imperialism, assuming it to continue unchecked, upon the party of the opposition.

There are signs that the party of the opposition along the old lines must suffer permanent disintegration. Two forces are attacking it, one economic, the other political. It is being disintegrated, from an economic standpoint, because the imperialist trade argument for territorial expansion, even with an accompanying militarism, is not being easily and readily controverted by those who adhere to the orthodox views of capitalism and competition. Business is always a practical, immediate question. The pressing problems in the world of industry and finance are the next dividend and the current rate of interest. In reality, "finance" never takes what is called a far look ahead for the simple reason that it must preserve itself in the imme-

¹ "Constitutional History of the United States," vol. 1, page 179.

diate future. If, therefore, owing to high industrial development at home, the interest rate has fallen to a low point in western commercial countries, and the field for the investment of the rapidly accumulating surplus of capital has become at the same time much narrowed, it follows that capital will seek at once fresh opportunities for investment, anywhere and everywhere, in order to keep itself employed and prevent the rate of interest from falling. In doing this capital will not look a century ahead; it will consider its own immediate prospects.

Now it is perfectly clear, as some imperialist writers assert, that under the old order of things capital has reached a point in Europe and America when the home field for profitable investment is narrowing. The savings bank interest rate has fallen so low that in the eastern part of the United States no family man earning a small salary can hope to put by enough in the average working life to live on the income of his savings, when the time comes for him to retire because of advanced years or impaired vitality. These facts are universally admitted. And when the commercial imperialist, living in a world where high tariffs are still a weapon of trade rivalry between nations, presents his argument for territorial expansion, wherever extended sovereignty or government control may bring new markets—or preserve old ones—and bring new fields for investment within the grasp of capital, he bases it on those facts. How does the anti-imperialist, whose economics are of the same orthodox competitive school, meet the argument? Usually, he does not meet it at all, from the viewpoint of economics; usually, he plants himself on certain moral principles hostile to war, conquest, militarism and on abstract political doctrines regarding freedom, self-government, the rights of man, and the right of nationality. But, when he does meet it, from the viewpoint of the old-fashioned political economy, does he meet it effectively? His answer fails, apparently, to sway the modern capitalist and manufacturer

because it projects the argument into the remote future, while "business" is thinking of the immediate future.

For example, the anti-imperialist, in answering the commercial imperialist, points out that the extension of our rule by force will entail such heavy expenses of war and administration upon the people at home that ultimately all the commercial profit from such adventure will be balanced by losses, and, in reality, the country as a whole will not be the gainer. Again, the anti-imperialist answers that while the commercial exploitation of such regions as China will probably open up new fields of investment for western capital, and thus tend to keep up the rate of interest, the time will come when those fields also will be exhausted, and then whither will capital turn? Again, he answers that in opening up these new fields of exploitation in the Orient the capitalist will so develop those countries that they will in time become manufacturing and capitalist countries themselves and, with their cheap labor, will surely begin a frightful industrial competition with our own people. The anti-imperialist answer, in short, while possessed of real strength, deals almost entirely in futures more or less remote. To every one of these points "business" is disposed to say, "sufficient unto the day is the squeezed lemon thereof," while it follows the law of its being by looking out for the main chance now. It cannot stop to theorize or prognosticate about ultimates when its chief concern is to provide for the next quarterly dividend. Nor will it be much disturbed over war taxes which the whole people, rather than any one set of interests, must bear.

At any rate, it is a startling fact that the old political opposition, whether in Germany,¹ Britain or the United States, is now split, or practically destroyed, along the line of the economic argument for imperialism. The anti-imperialist answer has no potency in Britain as a party life-preserver.

¹ The old liberal party of Germany has practically disappeared, and the only strong political force there opposed to imperialism is socialism.

Nearly the whole body of liberals who followed Mr. Chamberlain into the coalition with the tories in 1886 have become strong imperialists; indeed, none surpasses Mr. Chamberlain himself in the intensity of his imperialistic sentiment, although in his younger days he was a radical of the radicals in politics. Among the liberals of to-day the strong section which looks to Lord Rosebery for leadership is avowedly imperialistic. The political strength of anti-imperialism in Britain is now represented by an earnest wing of the old Gladstonians and the members of the Irish and social labor parties, in all having a comparatively weak influence at the present time upon British politics. The disintegration of the liberal party on this issue is complete, and probably one of the chief reasons for it—as clearly appears from the fact that London and all the great English industrial centres have become hotbeds of “Chamberlainism”—is the catchiness of the commercial argument for expansion and imperialism.

As for the United States, nothing has been more interesting than to observe that the gold Democrats, who are the capitalistic wing of the old Democratic party, have quickly developed strong imperialistic tendencies. It were an easy matter to mention influential newspapers of the gold Democratic and anti-Bryan character, such as the *New York Times* and *Brooklyn Eagle*, as well as prominent men, formerly supporters of Mr. Cleveland's two administrations, who are avowed advocates of the imperialistic policy on commercial grounds. It were also easy to show that in the South, where Mr. Bryan received all but thirteen of his electoral votes in the last presidential election, the commercial argument for imperialism has met with much favorable response. In view of the South's attitude toward the black race the response promises to be more favorable in the future.

One hazards nothing in saying that the former Democratic party of the United States, that is, the party which carried

Mr. Cleveland to victory in 1892, must remain hopelessly rent on the issue of imperialism.

Everywhere, also, the old opposition party is subject to the disintegrating, or paralyzing, effect of political forces that are peculiarly active during an imperialistic era. Approach this phase of the question *à priori* or inductively, as you please, and the conclusion is the same. Imperialism means the predominance of questions of foreign affairs in the politics of a nation, and the predominance of foreign affairs, for any length of time, means a weakening of party government through the weakening of the parliamentary opposition and the corresponding strengthening of the executive. For issues pertaining to foreign relations are always difficult for an opposition to handle owing to the feeling that party spirit should not pass beyond the three-mile limit. Criticism is more bitterly resented by those in power in matters of exterior policy than in affairs of domestic concern. The almost menacing cry, "Stand by the government"—right or wrong—is invariably heard when the government clashes with a foreign people or ruler. If such a crisis reaches actual war, however wicked the war may be, criticism of the party in power always shrinks in volume and the opposition as a whole becomes paralyzed. The slightest questioning of the government's policy is then construed as "unpatriotic" or "treason." In England Mr. Chamberlain, during the Boer war, has maintained exactly that attitude toward the critics of the government's policies.

That the national spirit should rise above party spirit in the stress of war time should be cordially conceded, yet no amount of patriotism can blind the clear thinker to the fact that the natural and most vital function of a parliamentary opposition grows atrophied while such a period lasts. Continue indefinitely, or for many years, a period in which international competition in its various phases enthalls the attention of a people, and it follows that party government

must suffer. It is probable that, owing to the problems connected with the opening of China, for example, the western nations, including the United States, have already entered upon such a period of prolonged attention to foreign affairs. *A priori*, party government in such a period must decline; are there any signs that it has actually begun to decline?

"It does not admit of doubt," writes Professor Paul S. Reinsch,¹ "that modern imperialism tends to withdraw public interest from the fields within which party government can best exert its influence." Running over the great imperialistic powers of Europe, what do we find? In Russia the advantages of an absolutism for competing with rival powers in the new race for empire have been so clearly realized that the movement for more liberal political institutions has almost disappeared, outside the nihilistic groups, as an appreciable force. "Now that all the national energies (of Russia) are concentrated upon the expansion of the imperial domain," writes Professor Reinsch, "the growth of a party system on western models is less likely than ever—in fact, it is an impossibility." And Alfred Rambaud,² the French historian of Russia, has but lately written:

"Russia is the only European power which has an absolute government. Its autocratic feature, so fiercely assailed upon the accession of Nicholas I. by the 'Constitutionals' or 'Republicans' of 1825, and under Alexander II. by the Nihilist conspiracies, seems to have taken on a new life in the estimation of the Russian people, because, according to the expression of Prince Oukhtomski, it is the necessary condition of the greatness of their nation and of her 'supernatural' and providential mission in Asia."

M. Rambaud notes that this despotism is at least "thoughtful of the economic interests and the well-being of the Russian people, blending its ambitions with the legitimate aspirations of the nation." With the popular imagination

¹ "World Politics," page 328.

² "Expansion of Russia," page 85.

heated by the fascinating dream of world empire for the Slav race, the practical paralysis of the liberal movement in Russia has come as a matter of course.¹

As for Germany, it did not require the Kaiser's act in sending an army under Count Von Waldersee to China without consulting the Reichstag to show that recent years have marked a decline in Parliamentary government.² Bismarck had succeeded before his retirement in breaking up the old German party system by his attacks on the Roman Catholics, his persecution of the socialists, his abandonment of the national liberals and his later affiliations with the agrarians and high protectionists. The Kaiser's speeches, since he assumed his aggressive rôle in building up a colonial empire, have been a kind of bugle call to the German people to range themselves "in serried ranks" behind him, repudiating the party system, in order that German interests abroad might not suffer from dissensions at home.

The degeneracy of party government in France, owing to external ambitions, is well summed up by Professor Reinsch.³

Is there also a decline of party government to be observed in the countries where it has flourished most, since the rise of democracy? The wreck of the great Liberal party of Gladstone would seem to afford an affirmative answer, so far as Britain is concerned, and that the wreck is due in no small degree to the imperialistic lurch of the past twenty

¹ The disturbances, chiefly in the universities, reported from Russia this spring (1901), may seem to contradict this view. The writer, however, cannot discern that those disturbances, in the main, were other than students' outbreaks due to the harsh administration by the late minister of education, M. Bogaliefpoff. (See dispatch from St. Petersburg in *New York Times* on April 21, 1901. See also the letter of Colonel W. R. Holloway, U. S. Consul General at St. Petersburg, to the editor of the *Indianapolis Journal*, reprinted in the *New York Times*, April 25, 1901.) The excommunication of Count Tolstoi may also have been a contributing cause of the disturbances.

² See "Governments and Parties in Continental Europe," by A. Lawrence Lowell, vol. ii, page 54; "World Politics," by Professor Reinsch, page 329; also a letter by Professor Theodore Mommsen—" Militarism and Bismarckism have thoroughly driven out of them (Germans) all desire for self-government"—as quoted in a Berlin letter, dated October 15, 1900, printed in the *New York Evening Post*.

³ "World Politics," page 330.

years is clear. The Liberal party became great and masterful in British politics only when the Napoleonic struggle had been so far forgotten as to permit the people to turn their attention to domestic affairs, and it has declined again as soon as the empire found itself confronted with a desperate international rivalry in the outside world. Party government in Britain reached its culmination in the middle and later periods of the nineteenth century when politics was almost exclusively devoted to questions of domestic reform. Parliamentary institutions certainly entered upon a golden age after the English reform bill of 1832 and never was the House of Commons more powerful or more splendid than in the days of Cobden, Bright and Gladstone.

When King Edward VII. opened his first Parliament there were no seats and scarcely any standing room for the members of the House of Commons in the chamber where the royal spectacle was unfolded. This was cause for complaint. While petty as an issue, it seemed to some observers¹ to signify "a foretaste of a more serious depreciation." The revived importance of the crown was, indeed, a favorite topic of discussion in London papers after Victoria's death, and it is worth observing that the notion sprang from the fact that the crown is the visible link between the dependencies and the United Kingdom. In an imperialistic age, therefore, even the crown, to say nothing of the cabinet, gains in prestige.²

In examining the forces making for the disintegration of the opposition we may not omit certain other considerations of importance. Students of the effect of modern imperialism upon democratic institutions agree that an actual necessity will be manifested for the concentration of great powers

¹ Letter by Professor Goldwin Smith to *Manchester Guardian*, March 6, 1901.

² Agreement on this point seems general in England. The *Spectator* not long ago said: "The power of government is nearly everywhere visibly passing to the cabinet." Professor James Bryce in the *Manchester Guardian*, April 5, 1901, declared: "Since 1880 the cabinet has grown in power at the expense of the legislature."

in the executive. The tendency in that direction is noted by two observers who are not in sympathy with each other on political issues. Professor Goldwin Smith¹ has written: "The tendency of imperialism to an increase of the power of the executive at the expense of the representative is already seen in England, where the House of Commons has of late been manifestly losing power while the ministry has manifestly been gaining it." The *Spectator* notes the same tendency and it intimates that such a tendency is toward absolutism.² The *Spectator* might well have noted not only the actual tendency, but the necessity for such a development in an imperialistic era chiefly characterized by intense competition between nations for political and commercial prestige. Imperialist testimony is not lacking, however, as to this requirement of the imperialistic system.³

Nor can anyone deny the real advantages in international competition which an absolutist government possesses. "No Parliament, therefore, no questionings, no blue or yellow books," writes M. Rambaud on this point in his "Expansion of Russia." "A restricted liberty of the press closes with respect the indiscreet lips of reporters and interviewers. Hence secrecy in both planning and executing is possible. There is no need of throwing dust in the eyes of Parliaments, of the newspapers and of the people; nor is there any need of brag, optimistic proclamations and of oratorical heroics. Great conquests can be accomplished silently." England was never more feared or more potent in foreign affairs than when she was ruled by the despot Cromwell. We must agree that concentration of power is an essential condition of the most successful international rivalry; and it follows that during an imperialistic era there will be a growing pressure, even in a democracy, to bring about all the concen-

¹ "Commonwealth of Empire."

² "Resolute opposition and the widest criticism of executive policy is not only legitimate but necessary; but the pulverizing of the parliamentary institution itself can make only for despotism."

³ "The United States as a World Power," by Charles A. Conant, the *Forum*, 1900.

tration of power in the executive necessary to successful competition.

Judge Simeon E. Baldwin,¹ of the Connecticut Supreme Court, points out that the powers of the president of the United States "have been steadily growing ever since that great office was created," and it is his opinion that they will continue to grow, as new occasions for their exercise arise. Already, he says, the President's great powers "make us fitter than most republics to play the part of a great power in large questions of diplomacy."² But there certainly can be no further concentration of powers in the executive of this republic without weakening parliamentary prestige and party opposition.

And, as a final consideration in this branch of the inquiry, we must remember that the old opposition must remain out of power substantially all the time while imperialism represents the nation's chief aspiration. It is no new thing in parliamentary government for one party to hold power for thirty, forty, even sixty years with only slight interruptions. The Democratic party of the United States held firmly the reins of government from 1800 down to 1860 with only such unimportant breaks as were occasioned by the Whig victories of 1840 and 1848, neither of which enhanced the strength of the Whigs nor weakened their opponents. From 1860 to the present day the Republicans have held power without more serious interruptions than the two terms of President Cleveland. The whole nineteenth century in American politics is thus seen to be divided into two grand divisions of time during which respectively one party or the other was practically supreme.

Under parliamentarianism, English politics have shown

¹ Article in *Yale Review*, 1901.

² An extension of the executive powers already under way is embodied in the so-called "Platt Amendment," providing for the organization of the government of Cuba. As the medium for intercourse with foreign governments, and as the enforcer of treaties the President will gain more power than will Congress from the arrangement.

the same phenomena. There was a long period of Whig ascendancy after the revolution of 1688, extending down to the accession of George III. and after, and then followed the Tory supremacy, beginning with the younger Pitt's ministry in 1783, and lasting until the political revolution of which the reform bill of 1832 was the culminating legislative expression. Then arose the modern Liberal party of England whose period of domination in British politics was but little broken for sixty years.

Viewed in the perspective of the two centuries of parliamentary government since the flight of King James II. it is evident that government by any one party broadly tends to run in cycles of many years' duration. Intelligent people scarcely need to be told that this tendency has a reason for being. In the evolution of nations the people in certain periods have different activities, different opportunities, different aspirations from those in other periods. After the flight of James II. with the ghost of monarchical absolutism, the party which was the special advocate and defender of parliamentary rule inevitably and logically had possession of the government most of the time until the reaction arose against the corrupt Whig aristocracy. During the first half of the eighteenth century the Whig nobles, whose political philosopher was Locke, represented the aversion to monarchical despotism and "popery," then the leading political instinct or idea of the English people. The later Tory domination represented not only the reaction against Whig rule and Whig corruption, but the popular spirit of antagonism to the exterior Napoleonic system, which England conceived to be hostile to English growth, and English freedom. The great Liberal supremacy during the larger portion of the nineteenth century was the expression of the Democratic impulse toward ecclesiastical, criminal law and fiscal reform, modern industrial development and the political emancipation of the masses.

In the United States, the respective periods of supremacy

enjoyed by the opposing parties for so many years, have manifestly been but expressions of the prevailing spirit of the American people—democracy showing more the particularist, centrifugal and anti-aristocratic tendencies not unnatural in the earlier part of the republic's life, and the Republicans of the later era responding to the passion for strong nationality, and to the demands of the prodigiously expanding industrial power of a young and favored people.

That the occasional interruptions in these long periods of party supremacy, caused by the passing of power for a brief stage to the opposition, have been of slight significance appears in the fact that at such times the opposition's lease of power has often been attended by highly important acts in harmony with the general policy of its great antagonist. Sir Robert Peel, who found himself at the fag end of the Tory period, was put into office as an anti-Catholic, but he carried Catholic emancipation. He was the leader of the English protectionists, but he carried free trade. So, too, Disraeli, another leader of the Tories, once "dished the Whigs" by carrying a liberal measure extending the franchise. John Tyler's nominal Whig presidency was notable for its designs upon Texas, which were as far as possible from Whig principles. Mr. Fillmore's administration protected slavery. And the supreme achievement of the presidency of Mr. Cleveland was the successful defence and maintenance of a monetary system which was at heart antagonized by the majority of his own party in Congress and supported by a majority of the party to which Mr. Cleveland was opposed.

What are the ultimate effects of these long periods of supremacy for one party upon the party of the opposition? Our historical perspective through two centuries of English and American politics cannot leave us in doubt. The effects are disuse, division, decay. The old party, reduced for a prolonged period to opposition, has had to be regenerated, often with a new name, before beginning a fresh era of

domination. Glance backward and observe certain facts. The English Tories who succeeded the English Whigs in power late in the eighteenth century were by no means the same party, in working program, as the Tories who had supported the Stuarts in their claims to rule by divine right. The Liberals who, early in the nineteenth century, snatched away the supremacy of the Tories, were different from the old Whigs from whom they had descended. And the conservatives, or unionists, in our own day who have finally brought, as it appears, the long period of Liberal ascendancy to an end, are not the same, in domestic politics at least, as those stout old Tories, their forbears, who believed that the reform bill and free trade and Catholic emancipation would throw Britain into unspeakable ruin. Coming to the United States again, we find that during the long period of Democratic ascendancy from 1800 down to 1860 the party of the opposition disintegrated and changed its name no less than twice—Federalist became Whig, and Whig became Republican before the party of Lincoln, Grant and McKinley began its prolonged lease of power.

So the disuse of a party leads to its decay; while parliamentary history in England and America seems to teach that the assumption of power for a lengthy period, during which a party must be the organic expression of a dominant national feeling or aspiration, presupposes a distinct change in the character of the party as compared with what it was in former periods of ascendancy.

If these principles be applied to the political situation in America to-day—granting that imperialism is to be the dominant idea in the immediate future—then it is highly probable, if not inevitable, that the party which has been pretty steadily in opposition since the Civil War will suffer still further disintegration from its prolonged inactivity in responsible government, and will finally undergo an important transformation in character before again becoming the organized political expression of the national life.

The cumulative effects of the new American imperialism upon the opposition party are now seen to be broadly destructive from various viewpoints, economic, political and historical. In politics, however, as in nature, decay may be coincident with growth. The decay of vegetation means the deposit of beds of coal. Energy may change its form, but it cannot be destroyed. While an old political party in democracies is undergoing dissolution, you may be sure that at the same time a new one is springing into life. Now, two things are manifest: first, however prolonged may be the supremacy of the imperialistic spirit, it must sometime burn itself out and be succeeded by some other; second, the field will then be open to the party—fresh in vitality although it may be old in name—which will have grown into being and slowly have swelled with vigor during the imperialistic régime, and which will have become the expression of the newly developed longings of the people.

III

THE SHADOW OF SOCIALISM

That the new party entity of the future—dimly forecasted perhaps—will be distinguished for socialistic proclivities must by this time have been suggested to the discerning mind.¹ In order to appreciate the full power of socialism

¹ Professor Edward Dicey, referring to British politics, has made this forecast: "Thus, if I am not mistaken, the liberal party of the future, under whatever name it may be known, will be a radical party with socialist proclivities. Such a party, whatever may be the predilections of its individual members, must of necessity be anti-imperialistic."—"The Downfall of Liberalism." *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1900.

Mr. John Morley has said "that the day when the Liberal party forsook its old principles (referring to anti-imperialism and anti-militarism) the Liberal party would have to disband and to disappear. . . . The socialists would take its place. He had in the past set his back to the wall against the socialists, but if he were to choose between the socialist and the militarist with all his random aims, his profusion of the national resources, his disregard of the rights and feelings of other people he considered the socialist's standards were higher, and his means were no less wise."—Address before the Palmerston Club at Oxford, 1900, as reported by the *London Chronicle*.

As for the United States, the *New York Sun*, Republican and conservative, said

to attract those who are always sure to be out of sympathy with the imperialistic spirit, it must be scrutinized without prejudice, and, if anything, with a touch of sympathy. In such a spirit, therefore, without attempting any profound or comprehensive analysis of socialism as a philosophy of humanity or a system of economics, let us briefly suggest its possible points of potency as they may present themselves in the minds of the scattered opposition.

Socialism seems to be the only system that can or will aggressively combat the economic argument for imperialism. Reduced to the lowest terms, that argument is the necessity for widening markets. Under the present order of society in the most civilized and most populous portions of the western world, the new markets must be found, it seems, almost anywhere but at home; yet no fact is more obvious than that the real *consuming* power, as contrasted with the *purchasing* power, of our own people has never been tested. When the products of American looms seek purchasers in China is it because there are no people left in America who desire or need those products, no people who would buy them if they could pay the price asked for them? The truth is that every great city has tens of thousands, and every town its hundreds, who have an enormous capacity for consumption which they cannot begin to satisfy; while the whole United States contains millions of people whose

editorially, January 3, 1901: "The Democratic party can never again be what it was before. . . . The issue of imperialism may assume a shape which will be less artificial than that it had in the last campaign, but it will be joined with radical social theories or be subordinated by them and made incidental only. It seems inevitable that the Democratic party of the future should become the expression of popular discontent with the conditions of material progress established and of resistance to them."

The Washington correspondent of the *New York Evening Post* wrote, November 23, 1900: "J. G. Shanklin, who has long been prominent in the Democratic politics of Indiana, proposes that the party should at once invade the field of Socialism. 'It should declare,' he says, 'for the initiative and referendum, for government ownership of all public utilities, for bimetallism, for an income tax, and for the election of United States Senators and other officers of the government by direct vote of the people. . . . Socialism seems to be the coming policy of government. If the Democratic party does not take it up, I believe there will be a new party.'"

poverty alone prevents them from consuming very many times more of the products of the nation than it is now their lot to consume even in the heyday of prosperity. During seasons of hard times we are familiar with the spectacle of production being curtailed while the army of the unemployed grows like a mushroom and the soup houses cannot be opened fast enough to keep honest and able-bodied folks from starving.

Socialism may be all wrong, but in meeting the economic argument for imperialism it will at least be able to point to the undeveloped consuming power of the people at home as an answer to the demand for new markets abroad that must be appropriated and held through the costly and bloody sacrifices of the sword. Socialism at least will not be timid in charging this under-development of the home market upon the old industrial order, and in attempting to show that commercial imperialism is itself essentially a confession of the economic failure of the old industrial system.

And socialism will also show that imperialism is but a postponement of the final reckoning among the great forces of international and national competition, that it offers no ultimate solution of the industrial problem which the competitive system has left to us. The world does not contain an endless round of new foreign markets, or virgin fields for the investment of surplus capital. The earth is but 25,000 miles in circumference and the era of "commercial exploitation" in strange lands is as sure to end as the age of geographical exploration. The present "undeveloped" countries will before long be developed and then we shall see surplus capital again racing ahead of its opportunities for investment. Give to China the utmost value as a field for commercial exploitation, and you must still face the time when China, so far as foreigners are concerned, will be in the condition of a squeezed lemon. And finally we must face a China transformed into a commercial competitor of untold power by the introduction of this same capital and

these same mechanic arts on which the West now bases its own supremacy. What must happen when the "jumping off place" in the hunt for new markets abroad has been reached? Must not an economic philosophy of the intensive rather than that of the expansive in industry then capture the field?

The socialistic assault upon commercial imperialism will not be weakened, meanwhile, by the insistence of the imperialistic writers¹ upon the highest possible development of the trust as a necessary agency in a successful struggle for supremacy in foreign markets. It amounts to this, the imperialists propose to destroy the principle of competition at home in order the more successfully to meet the conditions which the principle of competition imposes upon them abroad.

How far do they think they could go in such a process without pulling the whole house down over their heads? By the time the imperialists had reached the limit in the hunt for new foreign markets—and reach it they would even if the United States should become supreme in every market of the world—surely, the transition from the reign of private monopoly to the reign of public monopoly, or to the reign of socialism, would have been rendered all the easier. For consider the moral and intellectual effect upon the people of such a spectacle as this—an economic system destroying itself at home in order to maintain itself abroad. The sight of it could hardly be used as an argument to withstand the assault of socialism upon the entire régime of private monopoly. The economic process

¹ See "The United States as a World Power," by Charles A. Conant, the *Forum*; also, especially, "The New Industrial Revolution," by Brooks Adams, the *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1901. Mr. Adams writes: "The trust must be accepted as the corner-stone of modern civilization, and the movement toward the trust must gather momentum until the limit of possible economics has been reached. . . . Should America be destined to prevail in the struggle for empire which lies before her, those men will rule over her who can best administer masses vaster than anything now existing in the world, and the laws and institutions of our country will take the shape best adapted to the needs of the mighty engines which such men shall control."

would too much resemble a hungry snake swallowing itself by the tail, to be lost upon the humorous instincts of the American people.

Socialism at another point may prove capable of attracting the opposition because it is antagonistic to militarism and the processes of military conquest. According to all experience, imperialism involves militarism. Socialism, therefore, will be in a position to profit by the popular reaction against military burdens and losses, military influences and ideals. Itself humanitarian and idealistic regarding the masses of the people, socialism at least furnishes a strong contrast to the materialistic, coercive and often bloody phases of imperialism, and, therefore, it may easily draw to it the humanitarians and idealists who can never find their conceptions of life and government embodied in the moral philosophy of the stock exchange, Machiavellian diplomacy and the rapid-fire gun.

Socialism, furthermore, is not antagonistic to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. It demands equality in the broadest sense—whether or not it could bestow it—in the industrial as well as in the political world. As for liberty, it asserts that no economic liberty is possible under the régime of private monopoly which the imperialistic writers regard as the next step in the progress of the age. Nor does socialism deny, like the imperialist philosophers, that just government rests upon “the consent of the governed.”

The celebrated “consent” doctrine, which is associated so closely with the American Declaration of Independence, is necessarily repudiated by all imperialists. To Lincoln that doctrine was more sacred than any religious creed. But American imperialists in our time treat it as an outworn or discredited piece of “eighteenth century philosophy.”¹

¹ “Governments,” said Senator Platt of Connecticut, “derive their just powers from the consent of ‘some of the governed.’” Senator Lodge refers to it as a

While the exact philosophic and scientific significance of the "consent" doctrine, as a principle of government, may be hard to determine, it must still be recognized as a permanent force in affairs. It is an error to say that it originated with Rousseau. We can readily trace "the consent of the governed" doctrine back to the English philosophers, Locke and Hooker. The truth is that the doctrine of "consent" is inseparable from the doctrine of "the sovereignty of the people." And the doctrine of popular sovereignty is historically at the base of Democratic institutions.¹ If the "consent" doctrine has no future then Democratic institutions are doomed to perish.²

The "consent" doctrine, in short, is not only as old as the idea of democracy itself; it must always find earnest protagonists in people who are most sincerely devoted to democratic principles and institutions. It is a matter of some consequence, therefore, that while imperialism minimizes or denies the vitality of the doctrine, socialism must recognize it as being a sound and living principle. On that account, socialism will become the more attractive, or tolerable, to the true adherents of democratic ideals during an imperialistic régime.

No consideration of the "drawing" power of socialism would be complete or satisfactory, in this connection, without calling special attention to the close relation in so many minds between imperialism and plutocracy. It is not

mere "aphorism," a "fair phrase that runs trippingly on the tongue." The *New York Outlook* has thrown it over entirely, saying, "We do not believe that governments rest upon the consent of the governed;" while a Chicago clergyman, Rev. Dr. P. S. Henson, has been quoted as damning it beyond hope of resurrection in these vigorous words: "There never was a greater falsehood palmed off by the devil on a credulous world."

¹ See Gierke's "Political Theories of the Middle Age," translated from the German by Maitland, pages 37-48 and 92-93.

² See "English Political Philosophy," page 62, by William Graham, Professor of Jurisprudence at Queen's College, Belfast. Commenting on Locke's theory of "consent," which was borrowed and amplified by Rousseau, Professor Graham writes: "It is true that unless they (governments) finally rest on the unforced and willing consent or agreement of the people or the majority they are not free governments."

necessary, of course, to show that plutocracy supports imperialism, when imperialistic writers in America make so much of foreign markets and defend the development of trusts as requisite to industrial and diplomatic supremacy abroad. The notorious facts of the time in China, South Africa, the Philippines and other fields of imperialistic activity reveal the zest and "go" that commercialism gives to imperialism. When Germany began establishing her colonial empire Bismarck frankly declared that these new possessions were regarded not so much as fields for German colonization as markets to be developed for the products of German industry.

The growing power of this imperialistic plutocracy is alarming a great many people.¹ Wealth, historically considered, has never been in cordial sympathy with democratic aspirations. Its social cravings have been for privilege and aristocracy, an illustration of which to-day is the growing social alliance between American millionairess and the old world nobility. Nor is history without examples of the subjugation of democracy by mere wealth.² Since plutocracy is the main objective of socialism's assault, it seems reasonable that socialism, under an imperialistic régime, would attract those who regard the imperialistic movement as essentially plutocratic, and who hold that plutocracy instinctively and inevitably threatens popular institutions.

And now let us pass in review some of the evidence as to the antagonistic relation actually existing between imperialism and socialism. "In Germany to-day," writes Theodor Barth,³ "the Social Democracy appears as the most numerous political party of the German empire," and its growth, he adds, "has taken place mainly at the cost of the old Liberal party, and has been chiefly responsible for that party's

¹ Professor Sumner, of Yale University, has said that the great issue of the future is "plutocracy against democracy."

² See "Commonwealth or Empire," by Professor Goldwin Smith.

³ "Modern Political Germany," *International Monthly*, August, 1900.

remarkable loss of immediate influence in Germany." This great Socialist party is anti-imperialistic and from its ranks comes the great bulk of, as well as the harshest of, the German criticism of the Kaiser's adventures of aggression in such countries as China. It is a striking fact that German socialism has grown most since the government embarked upon its colonial policy. Although Ferdinand Lassalle founded the Social Democratic party as early as 1862, the German socialists were many years in making any real impression upon parliamentary life. In 1871 the Socialists elected but three members to the Reichstag; in 1887, eleven. But in October, 1900, there were fifty-eight Socialist members, and recent predictions¹ are that in the next general election the Socialist party in Germany will win 100 seats out of the total of 397, and poll at least 3,000,000 popular votes. The modern colonial policy of Germany was founded substantially in the decade ending in 1890. Ever since the election of 1887 the German Socialists have made steady and alarming gains.²

The case of Italy is also of interest. The Italian Socialists are anti-imperialistic, being opposed to foreign adventure and a burdensome militarism. In the elections of 1892 their candidates for Parliament polled only 27,000 votes; in 1895 they polled 80,000. Crispi's world-power ambition with its ruinous expenditure was now in full progress, and twelve Socialist deputies soon appeared in Parliament. The Italian military disaster in Abyssinia came in March, 1896, and since then Italy has had much of the expense but none of the glory of a "spirited foreign policy." The Italian Socialists, meanwhile, have been gaining ground steadily. In the last elections they scored a real triumph, and, with the small

¹ Berlin dispatch to London *Chronicle* in October, 1900.

² See Berlin letter, dated October 15, 1900, in New York *Evening Post*, which quotes Professor Hans Delbrueck as saying: "The most interesting among the German political parties to-day is unquestionably the Social-Democratic. It is the only one harboring problems, the only one holding out a probability of future development; and it also is, to judge by the number of votes cast for it at the Reichstag elections, by far the strongest numerically. The other parties are all more or less in a state of petrification."

groups of republicans and radicals, increased the strength of the "extreme left" in Parliament to about one hundred deputies. And it has come to pass that Victor Emanuel III. has welcomed "radicals or socialists" in the cabinet.¹ The influence of this anti-imperialist, Socialist party in Italy is so great that the Zanardelli ministry, coming soon after King Humbert's assassination, has made the reduction of taxes, particularly military burdens, a leading point in its program.

Nor is the relation between imperialism and Socialism any less distinct in France. In the general election of October, 1877, there were elected to the French Chamber of Deputies 96 Monarchists, 112 Bonapartists and 325 Republicans. The writer can find no mention of Socialists being returned at that time, and it is certain that as a party, or group, they had not then made an appearance in the parliament of the republic. The curious fact, already observed in German and Italian politics, is now plainly discernible in French politics, namely, that the rapid increase of the parliamentary strength of Socialism is coincident with the development of the imperialist or colonial policy. The modern French colonial empire, in the main, was founded in the '80's of the nineteenth century. With the Socialists scarcely an appreciable or known factor in the Chamber of 1880, the Jules Ferry policy of forcible territorial enlargement began in 1881 with the French invasion of Tunis. French aggression in Indo-China came in May, 1883, and the placing of Madagascar under the French protectorate in December, 1885. The Marquesa group of Pacific Islands was seized in September, 1888. In April, 1892, came the expedition against Dahomey in West Africa. From the Tunis invasion of 1881 down to the Fashoda collision with England in 1899 France was constantly at work extending her colonial empire, and not without serious and costly wars in Tonquin and Madagascar.

¹"The Situation in Italy," by Salvatore Cortesi, in *The Speaker* (London), February 23, 1901.

Professor Lowell,¹ in his brief history of French parties under the Third Republic, does not mention the Socialists as a party until the election of 1893 is reached. Tabulating the results of that election a French authority² credits the Socialists with 49 members of the Chamber of Deputies, as distinguished from the Radicals who won 122 seats. Therefore, French parliamentary Socialism had risen from substantially nothing, during the twelve years of foreign aggression, to a membership of 49 and an established status in French politics. The spring election of 1898 witnessed a further increase of Socialist strength, the composition of the Chamber after that test of the electorate being as follows: Republicans, 254; Radicals, 104; Radical-Socialists, 74; Socialists, 57; Rallied, 38; Reactionaries, 44; Nationalists, 10. Together the Socialists and Radical-Socialists, closely allied groups, made the largest party in the Chamber, except the Republicans. And this was seventeen years after the colonial policy was put in operation.

In the elections of 1898, it is of interest to recall that M. Meline, the conservative Republican leader, expressed confidence that the French people would choose deputies "firmly resolved to fight with vigor and without compromise the social revolutionary party." Yet he was mistaken. Socialism gained ground. And the parliamentary situation in the winter of 1900-01, nearly twenty years after the invasion of Tunis, revealed a ministry, that of Waldeck-Rousseau, which rested partly upon Socialist votes, and which had a Socialist, M. Millerand, as one of its members. The French Socialists, like the others, are anti-imperialistic, or anti-colonial and anti-militarist. Pierre de Coubertin³ complains of that in discussing the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry and its program. "Together with Roman Catholicism," he writes, "military institutions and colonial expansion were denounced as the Republic's most dangerous enemies."

¹ "Governments and Parties in Continental Europe," vol. i, page 94.

² Daniel, "L'Année Politique" for 1893, page 281.

³ "France on the Wrong Track," *American Review of Reviews*, April, 1901.

Socialism in Britain, while much less powerful, is no less anti-imperialistic than on the continent.¹ The Social Democrats, led by Hardie and John Burns, were intensely opposed to "Chamberlainism" in the recent parliamentary elections and they managed to hold their seats in the House of Commons, notwithstanding the war fever that prevailed in the country. Kier Hardie looks forward to the final struggle between liberalism and socialism for the supremacy in the opposition.² So far as Britain is concerned, also, not only is the existing political group that is called socialistic hostile to imperialism, but a portion of the old Liberal party is already socialistic.³ While it is true that most of the strongest liberal anti-imperialists are opposed to socialism, John Morley's attitude⁴ indicates that they would finally go with the socialistic wing as a last resort to fight imperialism.

In the United States we must again observe the fact that all the socialistic parties are anti-imperialistic. The labor unions are anti-imperialistic, notably the American Federation of Labor, the most influential of them all. The Populist party has had anti-imperialistic alongside its socialistic tendencies. In 1896 the Populist national platform adopted

¹ See "Election Issues," *The Labor Leader and Socialist Herald of London and Glasgow*, September 22, 1900.

² "Whatever amiable and good-hearted members of the Liberal party may think, those who control its destinies see clearly that between the commercialism of liberalism and the socialism of the Independent Labor party there can be no union . . . The struggle which is going on to-day is really one for supremacy. Either commercialism must swallow and absorb the socialist movement, or the socialist movement must gather to itself those sections of the community on which liberalism depends for its support, and thereby become the dominant factor."—Kier Hardie.

³ A member from Edinburgh, William McEwan, a free trade liberal of the old school, and also an anti-imperialist, declared about four years ago: "Ten years ago the party became tainted with the new Liberalism, which is really Collectivism . . . It is evident that we have now in the Liberal party two antagonistic forces—the one the old Liberalism, based on Liberty, the other the new Liberalism, based on Collectivism, based on Socialism and tyranny. These two forces can no more be blended or harmonized than water with oil. Sooner or later they will come into collision, and when that day comes, I am afraid a reconstruction of parties will be inevitable."—Quoted in *National Review*, January, 1901, in article on "The Political Transformation of Scotland."

⁴ See Morley's Palmerston Club speech.

at St. Louis called for postal savings banks, government ownership and operations of railroads, government ownership and the operation of the telegraphs, and the initiative and referendum—which showed the socialistic tendency. In 1900, the same party denounced the extension of American sovereignty to the Far East—which showed its hostility to imperialism.

The influence of Populism upon the old Democratic party must necessarily be socialistic, after successive campaigns of close alliance between the two. The trust and plutocracy issue in the presidential campaign of 1900 was pressed by Mr. Bryan on old-fashioned lines of individualism and competition without gaining any apparent response from the electorate. Yet one of the inner managers¹ of the Democratic campaign tells us that when certain Democratic nominees for Congress (1900) frankly advocated the destruction of monopoly by government assumption of monopoly enterprises, “in each case such candidates ran far ahead of their party tickets.” This is a significant fact if it reveals in America that tendency of anti-imperialistic democracy toward socialism, which this discussion had already led us to expect, rather than toward individualism.

“It looks,” says a conservative political observer,² “as if the line of divergence between the two parties would take this direction: The Republican party would become imperialistic and the Democratic party socialistic. Just what form these tendencies will take in another campaign cannot be foretold, but evidence is abundant that this will be the basis of the line of division.”³ But let us be cautious and say

¹ Willis J. Abbott, in the *Forum*, February, 1901.

² Washington correspondence of New York *Evening Post*, January 15, 1901.

³ The results of the spring municipal elections of 1901 in Toledo, Cleveland, Chicago and St. Louis are a confirmation of this forecast. In the two cities first named Democratic mayors, Jones and Johnson, were elected on municipal ownership platforms, Mr. Johnson even advocating the single tax theory. In Chicago, Harrison, Democrat, was elected largely because of his opposition to the street railway company's demands in franchise matters: while in St. Louis, the bolting Democratic, or Bryan, candidate for mayor, running on a municipal ownership

simply that the opposition party, sooner or later, will probably develop on socialistic lines, provided that the régime of imperialism has its run.

The supremacy of the South in the present Democratic party cannot be considered much of a bar to that party's socialistic development since the imperialism of the Republican party, with its now necessary doctrine of inferior races, is calculated more than anything else to win support there for the Republican organization. Imperialism will end the "Solid South" if ever anything can do it. For the negro has been the primary cause of political solidity in the old slave states. Now that the Republican party, turned imperialistic, has virtually accepted the South's view of the negro race, the centripetal force of Southern political life must disappear.¹

Looking through the vista of years in both Europe and America, socialism seems to be the logical antithesis, with its domestic radicalism, to the imperialistic spirit with its financial burdens, its military conquests and its race dominations abroad. The old Democratic party of 1874-92 in the United States can no more be restored than it was possible for the House of Bourbon to revive the *ancien régime* after the downfall of Napoleon. The Revolution had left an impress upon France which no extreme of reaction could remove. And so the revolution of Bryanism has left ineffaceable marks upon the Democratic party.

While imperialism continues to embody the chief aspirations of the American people the opposition will probably be unable to develop a political organization which will for long be intrusted with government. But out of the wreck

platform, polled about 30,000 votes as against 43,000 and 35,000 respectively for the two leading candidates. In Kansas City, too, the Democrats carried the city on the municipal ownership issue, and it was their first victory in years.

¹ "I find we have passed the point where the white people from necessity were arrayed on one side to protect their civilization, with the negro race on the other, and can now afford to divide on paramount political issues, as in other states."—*Ex-Senator M. C. Butler, of South Carolina, as reported in the Baltimore Sun, April 22, 1901.*

of the present opposition there will spring, as conditions may determine, a party of great and growing vitality that some day will dominate the land, simply because it will meet the requirements of a new age. "It is no longer possible to mistake the reaction against democracy," Professor Woodrow Wilson¹ has recently written concerning democratic institutions. There will, however, be a reaction to democracy again in good time.

If we must concede that the present imperialistic movement is inevitable as a stage in evolution, the socialist more than any other, perhaps, can see in it the forerunner of his ideal universally applied in the world's affairs. While completely antagonistic to socialism under present conditions, imperialism may break a path for socialism to follow along. Imperialism may tend to bring the various nations into a closer knowledge of and community with each other. By consolidating small states, reorganizing the undeveloped and eliminating the decrepit ones, it may do for the world in politics what competition has ruthlessly done for our most advanced industrial societies. The world is very far from preparedness for socialism, even if it be a coming system; no one nation could adopt it successfully unless the world as a whole had attained some quiescence from military or commercial wars. It may be, as Mr. Roosevelt predicts, that imperialism will finally command universal peace. In that event, socialism would find more favorable world conditions for trial.

But whatever the ultimate results may be, socialism promises to grow as a protest to imperialism, as the force which offers the most available and central rallying point for the opposition, as the ideal which most fully focuses all forms of human discontent. If there must be imperialism, its antithesis, it would seem, must be socialism. Such is the conclusion, however unwelcome it may be to many minds, to which this examination of present political tendencies now brings us.

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¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1901.